We propose that a control system will address the causal dynamics of the neural network that Depue & Collins regard as underlying extraversion. We briefly describe a control system approach and articulate the notion of integration. The integration of goals and regards is achieved by subcortical assessment of reward in the nucleus accumbens and VTA (ventral tegmental area) transmission of this information largely by dopaminergic systems and representation of reward in the MOC (medial orbital cortex). Thus reward information is collected, (...) integrated, and evaluated in the MOC. Such control decisions rely on constraining processes, a functional property of the MOC mediated largely by serotonergic neurons. (shrink)

When do people say that they are moved, and does this experience constitute a unique emotion? We review theory and empirical research on being moved across psychology and philosophy. We examine feeling labels, elicitors, valence, bodily sensations, and motivations. We find that the English lexeme being moved typically (but not always) refers to a distinct and potent emotion that results in social bonding; often includes tears, piloerection, chills, or a warm feeling in the chest; and is often described as pleasurable, (...) though sometimes as a mixed emotion. While we conclude that it is a distinct emotion, we also recommend studying it in a more comprehensive emotion framework, instead of using the ambiguous vernacular term being moved as a scientific term. (shrink)

Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible ...

The answer to the title question is “No.” The first section argues, using the example of Huckleberry Finn, that rational agents need not be motivated by their explicit judgments of rightness and wrongness. Section II rejects a plausible argument to the conclusion that rational agents must have some moral concerns. The third section clarifies the relevant concept of irrationality and argues that moral incoherence does not equate with this common relevant concept. Section IV questions a rational requirement for prudential concern (...) and whether a requirement for moral concern would follow from it. Section V examines the rationality of amoralists and partial amoralists, and Sect. VI closes with speculation on why there might seem to be a rational requirement to be morally motivated. (shrink)

With regard to my review of Kassel and Austin's PCG vii in CR 40, 223–5, Dr Colin Austin informs me that it has from the first been the intention to include chronological tables of comic productions in PCG i. I am very glad to take this opportunity of putting the record straight.

In this concise survey, intended for advanced undergraduate students of aesthetics, Alan Goldman focuses on the question of aesthetic value, using many practical examples from painting, music, and literature to make his case. Although he treats a wide variety of views, he argues for a nonrealist view of aesthetic value, showing that the personal element can never be factored out of evaluative aesthetic judgments and explaining why this is so.

Life's Values offers new analyses of the nature of pleasure, happiness, well-being, and meaning in life. Recognizing how individuals have different priorities, Goldman explains what is of ultimate value in our lives and argues that making our desires rational - relevantly informed of what it's like to satisfy them - maximizes well-being.

How foreign policy embodies human values is an issue worth studying. Such a value not only refers to the interests of social and political elites but to the prevailing welfare of people. In 2016, t...

Originally published in 1988, this book discusses if moral knowledge exists, and if so, if it is similar to other forms of knowledge. This book approaches the issues from both historical and contemporary perspectives and in order to determine whether there is a real property of rightness, looks to the ethical theories of Hobbes, Hume and Kant. This historical analysis leads to a systematic comparison of three theories of the nature of ethics: realism, emotivism and coherentism. The nature of coherence (...) is explained using legal reasoning as a model. Moral reasoning is compared and contrasted with reasoning both in science and law, showing how ethics differs from science and empirical disciplines. (shrink)

As the Roman philosopher Lucretius asked, why do we fear and regret death, but do not regret not having been born earlier, when death and prenatal nonexistence are mirror images? Both deprive us of goods we might have had, and this deprivation most plausibly explains the badness of death. This paper first considers and rejects explanations other than the deprivation of goods. It then suggests an explanation in terms of a state of which death deprives us, and which is itself (...) asymmetrical in regard to the future and the past. This sharp asymmetry in this one very important good helps to justify the difference in our attitudes, especially among those for whom death approaches. The paper departs from the usual rigid format in which a philosopher says what she is going to say, then says it, and then repeats it. In matching form to mystery content, the missing clue to the solution will not be revealed until later in the paper. (shrink)

Despite judging the central controversial thesis of this book false and arguments for it ultimately unconvincing, I highly recommend the book for its many philosophical virtues, prominent among them being breadth and clarity.1 1 Sullivan addresses all the major issues surrounding various time biases that decision-makers exhibit. Writing on topics that can often become overly technical, she spells her arguments out in the clearest prose, making the book ideal as an introduction to this interesting subdivision of practical reason, but also, (...) since packed with arguments, many original, and defending a counterintuitive if recently popular thesis, making this must reading for those familiar with its topics. (shrink)

This books examines the fundamental values and principles of conduct in the professions, focusing specifically on four areas: law, politics, medicine and business. One central question unifies its inquiry into the different professions: should the principles for judging the actions of professionals be the same as those used to judge private individuals, or do these professions require special moral principles to guide their conduct. The author considers arguments deriving from the underlying institutional goals of each profession in turn.

In Aristophanes' Wasps , Bdelykleon tells his jury-mad father that because the allied states are aware that the ordinary Athenian juror is an exploited creature, deliberately kept poor by the demagogues in whose hands the real power lies, σ μν γονΤαι Κννου ψφον, Τοτοισι δ δωρоφоρоῡσιν. The scholia see that Κόννου ψφον must mean ‘something worthless’, but they add on the authority of Kallistratos and Euphronios that Ar. has altered the original phrase: ΚαλλĺστραΤος παροιμαν φησ “Κόννου θρον”, παρ՚ ν παίζει (...) Εφρόνιος δ τι λέΧθη δι τ δύν τινα τν Κόννον εναι. … ψφον δ επε δι δι τ περ δικαστο λγειν. We cannot tell whether Euphronios was commenting on κóννον θριον or κóννον ψον, since although he was writing before Kallistratos, the latter need not have been the first to cite the phrase κóννον θριον in connection with our passage; indeed, the credit for first noting its relevance may belong to Euphronios himself. I shall be reverting to Euphronios' interpretation of the phrase presently. (shrink)

Genuine rules cannot capture our intuitive moral judgments because, if usable, they mention only a limited number of factors as relevant to decisions. But morally relevant factors are both numerous and unpredictable in the ways they interact to change priorities among them. Particularists have pointed this out, but their account of moral judgment is also inadequate, leaving no room for genuine reasoning or argument. Reasons must be general even if not universal. Particularists can insist that our judgments be reflective, unbiased, (...) informed, and sensitive, requiring a background of experiences that expand sympathy and empathy for others. But beyond this, our judgments must be coherent. This requirement provides a way to reason to the correct answer to a controversial issue—the answer most coherent with or body of settled judgments. Rawls' account of coherence in terms of reflective equilibrium, where we adjust particular judgments to match rules and adjust rules to match judgments, is rejected since rules have no independent force. Instead, the central requirement is that we not judge cases differently without being able to cite a morally relevant difference between them. Such differences must make a difference else-where as well, although they need not do so universally. Factors cannot be relevant in only one context because they reflect values that must recur to be maintained. The method of moral reasoning based on this requirement is specified as follows: first, the specification of competing values or interests in the problematic case; second, the location of paradigm cases in which these competing values are prioritized, making sure that these settled judgments are reflective, informed, and sensitive; third, the search for relevant differences between the settled and problematic cases or the location of alternative, more closely analogous paradigms. The paper ends with an illustration of the method applied to the issue of doctor assisted suicide. (shrink)

The adjective μøιμτωρ occurs, so far as our evidence goes, twice in Greek literature: in Aeschylus' Herakleidai and in Euripides' Andromache . And the ancient authorities are unanimous that it means, in the words of P. T. Stevens, ‘sons of the same father by different mothers, i.e. half-brothers’.

Diggle has followed Stevens in rejecting 1279–82. Stevens' objections to these lines were that they ‘should [sc. directly] follow a striking demonstration that birth is more important than wealth in marrying and giving in marriage', and that the lines do not form an apt comment on the fates of Peleus and Neoptolemos. The cogency of these objections will be examined presently; but first a counter-objection will be presented against the hypothesis of interpolation.

This is a response to Joshua Gert’s criticisms of my book Reasons from Within and defense of his own contrasting position.

Robert Nozick argued that we would not plug into his machine that could give us any experiences we chose. More recently Richard Kraut has argued that it would be prudentially rational to plug into the machine, since only experiences count for personal welfare. I argue that both are wrong, that either choice can be rational or not, depending on the central desires of the subjects choosing. This claim is supported by the empirical evidence, which shows an almost even split between (...) those who would enter and those who would not. If we interpret those on both sides as making rational choices to maximize their personal well-being, and if such rational choice tends to enhance well-being, then the experience machine thought experiment supports neither experientialism nor its denial, but instead a rational desire satisfaction account of personal well-being. Unlike objective list and perfectionist accounts, the desire satisfaction account of well-being easily accommodates rational choices on both sides, depending on the motivational sets of the choosers. (shrink)

The WEAVER ++ model discussed by Levelt et al. assumes incremental encoding and articulation following complete encoding. However, many of the response latency results can also be accounted for by assuming incremental articulation. Another temporal variable, initial segment duration, can distinguish WEAVER ++'s incremental encoding account from the incremental articulation account.